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JUDICIAL OPINIONS AS BINDING LAW AND
AS EXPLANATIONS FOR JUDGMENTS
Thomas W: Merrill*
To what extent does the executive branch have autonomous powers of legal interpretation? The issue is often broadly framed in terms
of two disparate understandings of the allocation of interpretative
power: "judicial supremacy" and "departmentalism." 1 In this paper,
I shall speak of two different understandings of judicial opinions: the
idea that judicial opinions (or at least the "holdings" of opinions) are
legally binding on actors in the executive branch, and the idea that
opinions are, from the perspective of executive actors, merely explanations for judicial judgments. I adopt this locution because it focuses
more precisely on the core of the controversy over autonomy in executive interpretation. Most persons. agree that the executive branch
has an obligation to enforce valid final judgments rendered by the judiciary. 2 What has been, and remains, controversial is whether the
executive is bound to follow the u~derstanding of law set forth in judicial opinions in future controversies involving persons not party to a
judicial judgment. Consequently, in order to determine whether the
executive has autonomous powers of interpretation, it is necessary to
examine the nature of the executive obligation to the understanding of
law set forth ~n judicial opinions. ·
I will argu_e th!:lt the nature of that ·obligation cannot be resolved
by examining pronouncements bearing on the subject by past
Supreme Court Justices or Presidents. Nor can the answer be deduced from provisions of the Constitution, from specific judicial
precedents, or from assumptions about the nature of the judicial hierarchy. Attempts to resolve the question using these types of arguments ultimately beg the underlying issue in dispute. Moreover,
although the fundamental question is jurisprudential in nature, I will
• Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. B.A., 1971, Grinnell College; B.A.,
1973, Oxford University; J.D., 1977, University of Chicago.
I would like to thank Steve Calabresi, Anthony D' Amato, Gary Lawson, and Marshall
Shapo for their helpful suggestions on an earlier draft.
I See, e.g., Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter, 48 REV. POL 401, 406-12 (1986). Professor Murphy also discusses a third
possibility: "legislative supremacy." Id. at 410-11. This option, however, has had little influence since it was rejected in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). See infra text
accompanying notes 33-34 for additional consideration of this option.
2 For further discussion of this assumption, see infra text accompanying notes 56-61, and
124-26.
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not seek to resolve it by linguistic or logical analysis. Instead, I will
offer two distinct lines of argument-one coherentist and the other
consequentialist-each of which provides some support for the conclusion that judicial opinions ought to be regarded, at least by executive actors, 3 as explanations for judgments.
The coherentist argument begins by delineating three possible
conceptions of executive obligaiion to judicial precedent; the first two
support the binding law position, while the last supports the view that
opinions should be regarded as explanations for judgments. The "incorporation" conception posits that judicial constructions of enacted
law enter into and become part of the instrument being construed.
Because the executive is bound by enacted law, it follows under this
understanding that it is also bound by judicial precedent construing
such law. The "interbranch stare decisis" conception posits that the
norms of precedent-following that guide courts also apply across
branches of government. Thus, just as the doctrine of vertical stare
decisis imposes an obligation on lower courts to follow the precedents
of superior courts, the interbranch version of stare decisis would require executive actors to follow judicial precedents more generally.
Finally, the "prediction" conception posits that judicial opinions,
from the perspective of nonjudicial actors, are simply legal essays that
provide information useful in predicting what judgments courts will
enter in future controversies. On this understanding, legal opinions
are obviously of great importance to executive actors, but should not
be regarded as imposing a direct obligation of obedience.
I will argue that both the incorporation theory and the interbranch stare decisis conception are in tension with various conventional understandings of our legal system. The prediction theory is
not wholly without its difficulties, but on balance, it seems to harmonize better with the general warp and woof of American public law.
Thus, on coherentist grounds, there is reason to prefer the view that
executive actors should regard opinions as explanations for
judgments.
The consequentialist argument looks at the effect of adopting one
or the other understanding for both the balance of power between the
branches of government and the role and function of the courts. I will
argue that the choice between opinions-as-binding-law and opinionsas-explanations does not have surpassing significance for the legal sys3 I do not suggest that members of the judiciary should adopt the explanations-for-judgments understanding of legal precedent. The functioning of the judicial branch might be seriously undermined if lower courts did not regard themselves as bound to follow higher court
precedent. See infra note 127.
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tern. Nevertheless, adopting the binding law understanding would, at
the margins, enhance the perceive4 power of the judiciary, and would
make it somewhat more likely that courts will be able to impose a
single authoritative vision of federal law on the other branches of government. Those who value uniformity in federal law and regard the
judiciary as an inherently superior interpretative institution will therefore find reason to prefer the binding law position.
On the other hand, the explanations-for-judgments view of judicial precedent would promote a more consultative and interactive relationship among the branches. If judicial opinions are viewed as
explanations, then the other branches may conceive of better explanations. Thus, if one is attracted to the 'idea of a more "dialogic" relationship between the political and judicial branches, this perspective
should have some appeal. Moreover, if judicial opinions are understood by nonjudicial actors to be nothing more than predictive of future judgments, this should induce courts to behave in a more
restrained fashion. Stripped of the, power to declare the law for other
branches, the influence of the courts would be a direct function of the
level of confidence with which nonjudicial actors can predict future
judicial behavior. Consequently, if courts want to influence the other
branches, they would be forced to be highly predictable, i.e., to adhere
strictly to their prior precedents.
How one views the choice between conceptions of executive obligation to judicial opinions will therefore be a function in part of one's
aspirations for the federal judiciary. Champions of the Warren and
Burger Courts who would like to see federal courts move aggressively
to transform existing social policy should be drawn to the idea that
opinions are binding law. Only on this understanding will courts be
able to modify the law and still maintain a claim of entitlement to
obedience by the other bran.ches. Conversely, those who would prefer
that the judiciary play a more restrained role-one that adheres to
existing social consensus-are more likely to be attracted to the idea
that opinions are, from the perspective of the other branches, explanations for judgments. On this understanding, the power of the courts
will depend on the predictability of their behavior, and their behavior
will be predictable only if it is restrained.

I.

THE RANGE OF CONTROVERSY

At the outset, it may be helpful to review the range of contestable
issues concerning the autonomy of executive branch interpretation.
Although the fact that some issues are contested and others are considered settled does not prove that the critical options have necessar-
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ily been identified as a matter of first principles, this information is
valuable to someone like myself who proposes to engage in a more
pragmatic inquiry. Moreover, some sense of the legal landscape will
help to orient the discussion.
When we step back and view the division of authority between
executive and judicial interpretation from afar, two general areas of
agreement are apparent. 4 First, no one denies that the President and
his agents have the authority to interpret federal statutes in default of
any judicial construction. 5 Thus, when Congress enacts a new law
and charges an executive agency with its implementation, there is no
requirement that the agency file a declaratory judgment action seeking guidance from a court before it can act. To this extent, there is no
dispute that the executive branch has at least limited autonomous
powers of interpretation, specifically, the power to interpret a statute
and to act on that interpretation until a court renders a contrary
interpretation.
On the other hand, there is widespread agreement that the executive has a legal duty to enforce valid final judgments rendered by
courts, regardless of whether the executive agrees with the legal analysis that forms the basis for the judgment. 6 As the papers of my two
co-panelists demonstrate, this understanding is not universaL7 However, I would venture to guess that the sample of views reflected by
this panel is extremely unrepresentative on this point. The decision
discussed by Professor Paulsen, Ex parte Merryman, 8 is the only reported instance of which I am aware where a President asserted the
power to disregard a judicial judgment on the ground that he disagreed with its legal basis. 9 President Lincoln's action was contrary
to his own previously expressed views about judicial supremacy, 10 and
4 See infra part IV for brief consequentialist justifications for these two consensus views
about the division of interpretative authority between the executive and the judiciary.
s See Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 905
(1990); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969,
1004-05 (1992).
6 For an especially forceful statement of this understanding from a strong proponent of
executive autonomy in interpretation, see Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 926.
7 Michael S. Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive
Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 81 (1993); David A. Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 113, 123-25 (1993).
s 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
9 The State of Georgia refused to comply with the judgment of the Supreme Court in
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). Although legend has it that President
Jackson said, "John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it," no formal request for executive enforcement was ever made. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL
COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835, at 737-38 (1988).
10 Lincoln's position about the authority of the Dred Scott case was that although it did not
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is today regarded as an aberration. 11 Much more representative of
contemporary attitudes is the universal approbation that followed
President Nixon's prompt decision to comply with the judgment entered in the tapes case. 12
When we move beyond these shared understandings, however,
we enter contested territory. The central point of disagreement,
which is the focus of this paper, is whether the executive is bound not
only by final judicial judgments, but also by the exposition of law contained in judicial opinions. Controversy over the binding effect of the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution has flared at several critical junctures in our nation's history. 13 For example, President Andrew Jackson, in his message accompanying his veto of the
extension of the Second Bank of the United States, 14 took the position
that the Bank was unconstitutional, notwithstanding the Supreme
Court's decision in McCulloch v. Maryland 15 to the contrary. Similarly, after the Court's ill-fated decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 16
holding that Congress did not have the power to abolish slavery in the
territories, 17 Abraham Lincoln took the position, both in his debates
with Stephen Douglas and in his First Inaugural Address, that the
decision could not serve as a "political rule" governing the actions of
members of Congress and the President in considering future
legislation. 18
establish a "political rule" for elected officials it was binding on the parties to the suit. See
infra note 18. The writ of habeas corpus in Merryman ran to an officer in the executive
branch, and hence, the executive was a party to the judgment. Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 14445 .
.11 See JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 140-50 (1980) (surveying examples of noncompliance with Supreme Court decisions by both governmental and
nongovernmental actors).
12 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
13 Three recent studies provide illuminating explorations of aspects of this history: JOHN
AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1984); ROBERT A.
BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT (1992); LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIA·
LOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS (1988).
14 Andrew Jackson, Veto Message, (July 10, 1832), in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, at 576, 586-88 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896).
15 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
16 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
11

Id.

18 For relevant excerpts, see STEPHEN DOUGLAS, CREATED EQUAL? THE COMPLETE
LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF 1858, at 43 (P. Angle ed., 1958), reprinted in THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CONSTITUTION? THE DEBATE OVER INTERPRETIVE
AUTHORITY 67-69 (Occasional Paper No. 3, 1992); ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 2 THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 516 (R. Basler ed., 1953), reprinted in THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, WHO SPEAKS FOR THE CONSTITUTION? THE DEBATE OVER INTERPRETIVE AUTHOR·
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More recently, the question of the executive's duty to judicial
understandings of the law has also arisen in the controversy over intracircuit nonacquiescence: 19 When a federal court of appeals rejects
the legal position of a federal administrative agency responsible for
administering a national statutory program, must the agency immediately adopt the court's understanding for future cases involving other
parties in that circuit, or may it continue to enforce its own understanding of the law? Various answers to this question have been offered. Executive actors in the Reagan and Bush administrations took
the position that nonacquiescence is proper in many circumstances; 20
several courts of appeals and commentators disagreed. 21 At bottom,
the question again turns on whether executive agencies are bound by
the judicial understanding of the law as set forth in judicial opinions.
If opinions are binding law for executive actors, it is hard, if not impossible, to justify the practice of intracircuit nonacquiescence. Alternatively, if opinions are, from the perspective of the executive branch,
explanations for judgments, then the practice of intracircuit nonacquiescence may implicate considerations of prudence and interbranch
comity, but it does not entail the breach of any legal duty.
Thus, in two different contexts we have witnessed a distinct lack
of consensus over the question whether the understanding of law embodied in judicial opinions is binding on executive branch actors. 22
Other variations on this question have also arisen. For example, different views have been advanced ·about whether executive officials
have any power, in advance of a decision by a court, to decline to
ITY 71.73 (Occasional Paper No. 3, 1992); ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 7 A CoMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 3210-11 (J. Richardson ed., 1897-1925), reprinted in Lours FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA w
20-21 (1992). These sources are excelient compendia of the various controversies that have
erupted over our history involving interbranch interpretation of the Constitution. See also
PAUL B.REST & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CoNSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING (3d
ed. 1992) (a leading casebook that also includes excerpts of many of these materials).
19 See generally Dan T. Coenen, The Constitutional Case Against /ntracircuit Nonacquiescence, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1339 (1991); Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (l 989); Deborah Maranville,
Nonacquiescence: Outlaw Agencies, Imperial Courts, and the Perils of Pluralism, 39 VAND. L.
REV. 471 (1986).
20 See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 19, at 684 n.21 (citing Letter from Thomas W.
Merrill, Deputy Solicitor General & Edwin S. Kneedler, Assistant to the Solicitor General, to
Mary Candice Fowler (May 9, 1988)). The letter, which commented on a draft policy statement regarding administrative nonacquiescence of the Administrative Conference of the
United States, sets forth views which diverge in several respects from those expressed herein.
21 For citations, see Coenen, supra note 19, at 1342-43 n.7.
22 For a rare commentary linking the two points of controversy, see Paul L. Colby, Two
Views on the Legitimacy of Nonacquiescence in Judicial Opinions, 61 TuL. L. REV. 1041
(1987).
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execute a law on the ground that they believe it is unconstitutional. A
panel of the Ninth Circuit has opined that executive agents act in
"bad faith" if they refuse on constitutional grounds to enforce a statute they are charged with administering, even if their constitutional
beliefs are reasonable. 23 Others maintain that the justification for
"presidential review" is no different than the justification for judicial
review, and if the Constitution permits one, it must countenance the
other. 24 I will not explore this or other variations on the question of
executive autonomy in interpretation here. 25 There is enough to be
said about the most basic. point of controversy: whether executive actors are bound by judicial understandings of law set forth in opinions,
or whether they may regard judicial opinions as merely explanations
for judicial judgments.
·

II.

FALSE STARTS

Until fairly recently, the conventional wisdom in the legal academy appeared to be that statements of law in judicial opinions are
binding only on the parties to the judgment under the rules of res
judicata and on the courts themselves under principles of stare decisis. 26 In the last two decades, however, a silent shift seems to have
23 Lear Siegler, Inc. Energy Prods. Div. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1121 (9th Cir. 1988),
withdrawn on other grounds, 893 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane). The occasion for this
pronouncement arose out of litigation that began when officials in the Reagan administration
refused to follow the bid protest provisions of the Competition in Contracting Act, which they
regarded as violating principles of separation of powers. See Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 787 F.2d 875, modified, 809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 485 U.S.
958, cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 918 (1988). When the Ninth Circuit rejected the administration's position, a panel of that court awarded attorneys' fees to the bid protestors based on the
"bad faith" of the Executive, reasoning that the President has no authority to refuse to enforce
a federal statute based on his own assessment of its constitutionality. Lear Siegler, 842 F.2d at
1117-26.
24 Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 919-22.
25 Another issue of at least potential controversy is whether the executive branch is required to adopt the same norms of interpretation employed by courts. This question is critical
to the controversy over the proper basis for judicial deference to administrative interpretations
of law. The Supreme Court's decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), suggests that courts must defer to agency interpretations of
statutes they are charged with administering-not because the agency interpretation is probative of the intentions of the enacting Congress (the norm courts would presumably employ),
but because agencies are more accountable to the public. Id. at 865-66. This rationale for
deference, in turn, appears to presuppose that agencies can and perhaps should interpret statutes using different interpretative norms than courts employ-norms grounded in some conception of contemporary public policy rather than original intent. Thus, the strong version of
the deference doctrine articulated in Chevron appears to require that agencies have autonomy
to adopt a different canon of interpretation than the one applied by courts.
26 The all-star list of constitutional law scholars who appeared to endorse this position
includes: ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 263-64 (l 962); EDWARD S. CORWIN, COURT OVER THE CONSTITU·
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taken place, to the point where ·many commentators (and most
judges) presuppose the opposite view: that judicial understandings of
law are directly binding on executive actors.
·
One prominent sign of this ·shift was the response to Attorney
General Meese's speech at Tulane Law School, distinguishing between the Constitution and Supreme Court opinions interpreting the
Constitution, and arguing that only the former is the "supreme law of
the land. " 27 The speech was vilified in editorials as an attack on the
rule of law. 28 The shift is also seen in the often-heated discussions
over the propriety of intracircuit nonacquiescence. Agency nonacquiescence has long been part of the legal landscape, 29 but in the late
1980s courts became sharply hostile toward the practice, and the law
reviews quickly filled with elaborate analyses of why intracircuit nonacquiescence is unconstitutional or at least abhorrent to the rule of
law. 30 These commentaries nearly all take the position that the executive is directly bound by judicial precedent.
If there has been a shift in the conventional wisdom on the subject, however, the reasons for the shift remain elusive. Indeed, to a
remarkable degree, the authorities and arguments advanced by partisans on both sides of the controversy simply beg the answer to the
ultimate question concerning the nature of the executive's duty to judicial opinions.
The favorite authority among· the many advocates of the view
TION: A STUDY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT 6869 (1938); PHILIP B. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT
116 (1970); Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25 n.155 (1964); Arthur S.
Miller & Alan W. Schellin, The Power of the Supreme Court in the Age of the Positive State: A
Preliminary Excursus-Part One: On Candor and the Court, or, Why Bamboozle the Natives?,
1967 DUKE L.J. 273, 289; Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and
When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1363 n.2 (1973); Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1008 (1965).
27 Edwin Meese Ill, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979 (1987). For further
debate, see John Harrison, The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in Interpreting
the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 371 (1988); Burt Neuborne, The Role of the Legislative
and Executive Branches in Interpreting the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 375, 375-76
(1988).
28 See, e.g., Michael Kinsley, Meese's Stink Bomb, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1986, at A19;
Anthony Lewis, Law or Power?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1986, at A23 (describing Meese's position as "a calculated assault on the idea of law in this country"); Edwin M. Yoder, Jr., Ed
Meese: Quarreling with Custom, to No Apparent End, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1986, at Al9.
29 See Alan D. Vestal, Relitigation by Federal Agencies: Conflict, Concurrence and Synthesis of Judicial Policies, 55 N.C. L. REV. 123 (1977).
30 See generally Coenen, supra note 19; Matthew Diller & Nancy Morawetz, Intracircuit
Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown of the Rule of Law: A Response to Estreicher and Revesz,
99 YALE L.J. 801 (1990); Joshua I. Schwartz, Nonacquiescence, Crowell v. Benson, and Administrative Adjudication, 77 GEO. L.J. 1815 (1989).
·
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that judicial opinions are binding law, including the anti-Meese editorial writers and the courts of appeals that have vented their anger
against intracircuit nonacquiescence, is Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison, 31 and especially the line that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is." 32 As most students of Marbury have recognized,
however, the decision does not resolve the question whether the judicial understanding of law binds the other branches. 33 The point established in Marbury-and the issue to which the foregoing quotation is
germane-is that courts are not bound by congressional understandings of the meaning of the Constitution. Thus, Marbury determined
that courts mustexercise independent judgment about the meaning of
the law in performing the function of resolving particular cases and
controversies; 34 it did not address the distinct question whether the
judicial understanding, once reached, is binding on the other
branches. In other words, Marbury establishes the autonomy of judicial interpretation. It does not demonstrate the absence of autonomy
in executive interpretation.
If the "province and duty" line does not carry the day, then perhaps Marbury is relevant at a deeper level. Marbury also suggests
that judicial review is necessary in order to preserve the idea of limited government-government subordinated to a written Constitution. 35 Therefore, the argument might run, all persons must be bound
by the understanding of the Constitution reflected in judicial opinions,
because if this were not the case, constitutional limitations could be
overrun by widespread interbranch nonacquiescence. This argument,
however, begs the crucial question whether the courts' ability to issue
judgments binding on the parties before them is enough to control
usurping behavior by other governmental actors. Marbury itself is far
from one mind about the need for judicial control of executive action,
noting that "[t]he province of the court is, solely, to decide on the
rights of individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or executive
officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion." 36 Given this
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Id. at 177.
See, e.g.' LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LA w § 3-2, at 25 (2d ed.
1988); Paul ·Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27
STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975); William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison,
1969 DUKE L.J. l, 37-38.
3 4 Indeed, the very next line of the opinion links the "province and duty" to the casedeciding function of the courts: "Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule." 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
3S Id. at 176-78.
36 Id.; see also id. at 166.
31

32
33
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ambivalence about the need for judicial control of executive action, 37
it is hard to see how the Marbury Court would necessarily have
thought that the executive must be checked by the strong medicine of
a duty to follow judicial opinions, rather than by the milder tonic of a
duty simply to obey judicial judgments in questions involving individual rights.
In addition to Marbury, opinions-as-law proponents also invoke
the crisis that confronted the Court when a former governor of Arkansas denounced Brown v. Board of Education 38 and called for
resistance to school desegregation in Little Rock, Arkansas. This episode led the Court, in Cooper v. Aaron, 39 to offer its one unambiguous
endorsement of the idea that judicial opinions are themselves binding
law: "[T]he interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated
by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land, and
Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States
'any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.' " 40
The Cooper v. Aaron episode, however, cannot be regarded as
definitive proof of the existence of a legal duty on the part of the executive to conform to judicial opinions, for several reasons. First, the
only authority cited by Cooper for the proposition that Supreme
Court opinions are the "supreme law of the land" was Marbury,4 1
and, as we have seen, Marbury does not say this. Second, the defiant
actors in Cooper were .not federal but state officials. There may be
reasons for conferring broader federal court authority over state actors than over members of coequal branches of the federal government. 42 Third, in Cooper, Governor Faubus was guilty not only of
casting aspersions on the decision in Brown, but also much more seriously of using the national guard to frustrate the implementation of a
judicialjudgment: the district court decree ordering the integration of
the Little Rock schools. 43 The exact issue before the Supreme Court
37 For an excellent discussion of the limited and tentative nature of the assertion of judicial
power i~ Marbury, see BURT, supra note 13," at 119-32.
38 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
39 358 U.S. I (1958).
40 Id. at 18.
41 Id.
42 As Justice Holmes once observed: "I do not think the United States would come to an
end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would be
imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the several States." OLIVER
W. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295-96 (1920).
43 The background of the case is described in detail in Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme
Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, '1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 390-403.
See also BURT, supra note 13, at 285-93.
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was whether the district court should have modified its judgment in
the face of this official resistance. The Court's undoubtedly correct
answer was "no." The Court's statement about its understanding of
the Fourteenth Amendment being "the supreme law of the land" was
thus dictum not necessary to resolve the issue before the Court. Indeed, it can be argued that the Court would have done more to overcome resistance to desegregation by stressing the duty to respect the
judgments of federal district courts than by wrapping its own opinions
in the authority of the Supremacy Clause.
In any event, even if Cooper could be taken as the Supreme
Court's last .word on whether judicial opinions are binding on executive actors, that would hardly resolve the question. For the scope of
the executive's duty to the decisions of the Court is obviously something that the Court cannot declare unilaterally: the answer must be
one that is perceived to be correct by both branches. It is a commonplace that no person should be a judge in his own cause. 44 The maxim
is often cited in support of the idea that disputes should be resolved by
an independent judiciary, capable of resolving controversies impartially and according to law. 45 But when the very issue is the scope of
the power of the independent judi~iary, the principle requires that
unilateral assertions of power by courts be supported by arguments
that go beyond the invocation of the court's own authority.
Some of the more thoughtful advocates of opinions-as-law have
not rested with the citation of Marbury and Cooper, 46 and have gone
further to suggest that the text of the Constitution requires that the
executive treat judicial opinions as legally binding. 47 Unfortunately,
the favorite textual provision, the Take Care Clause of Article II, Sec44 E.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 204-09 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (Congress
should not be a judge in its own cause); THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 59 (James Madison)
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (factions should not be the judge of their own cause).
45 E.g., Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1967); United States v.
United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258,· 308-09 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
4 6 Professor Schwartz has offered a third legal chestnut assertedly incompatible with the
practice of agency nonacquiescence: Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). See Schwartz,
supra note 30. I am in general agreement with Professor Coenen's criticisms of this ingenious
argument, see Coenen, supra note 19, at 1397-98 n.307, and would add only two further observations. First, the Schwartz argument, if accepted, would at most only establish that agencies
must follow judicial precedent in adjudicating claims between adversely situated parties. It
would not establish that nonacquiescence is improper with respect to agency rulemaking. Second, for reasons I have spelled out elsewhere, I reject the premise that Article III gives courts
exclusive authority to resolve cases and controversies, and I think the Supreme Court, given
the totality of its post-Crowell jurisprudence, must be regarded as having rejected this premise
as well. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers, 1991
SUP. Cr. REV. 225.
47 Coenen, supra note 19, at 1389-1402.
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tion 3, does not resolve the question one way or the other. The clause,
included in a list of miscellaneous presidential powers and duties,
states: "[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."48
Although it has been earnestly insisted that one cannot "faithfully"
execute the laws while defying the understanding of the law reflected
in judicial opinions, 49 this simply begs the question whether such understandings are properly regarded as themselves "the Laws" for purposes of the Take Care Clause. If one construes the reference to "the
Laws" to mean only the Constitution, federal statutes, and treaties, so
then the President would not be derelict in his duty to take care that
the laws be faithfully executed if, after determining in good faith that
the judicial understanding of the law is wrong, he declines to follow it.
Indeed, if we think of opinions as explanations for judgments, the
President would arguably violate his duty of "faithfulness" if he did
the opposite, that is, if he chose to follow a judicial explanation of the
law notwithstanding his own conscientious assessment that the judicial understanding was wrong.
Another constitutional argument which has been vented in the
nonacquiescence literature is that an agency decision to disregard the
judicial understanding of law in future cases violates equal protection. s1 The argument is that nonacquiescence produces unequal treatment of the rich and the poor, because only the rich will be able to
pursue the government through judicial review to obtain reversal of a
position already invalidated by another court. s2 However, as the
more thoughtful proponents of the opinions-as-law perspective admit, s3 the argument is weak. X (whether rich or poor) had to sue the
government to win, and now Y (whether rich or poor) also has to sue
the government to win. In what respect are they being treated
differently?
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
Coenen, supra note 19, at 1389-91.
50 This is a plausible construction, especially when the parallel use of "Laws" in the
Supremacy Clause refers to laws "made in Pursuance" of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST.
art. VI. The framers would not have regarded judicial doctrine as "made" in this sense. See
Thomas W. Merrill, The Judicial Prerogative, 12 PACE L. REV. 327, 336-37 (1992); see also
Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444 (1924) (holding that "Law" for purposes of the Contracts Clause, Article I, § 10, does not include state judicial decisions). But see Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72-73 (1938) ("laws of several states" in Rules of Decision Act includes common law).
51 Coenen, supra note 19, at 1352-55. Opponents of nonacquiescence have also asserted
that it violates procedural due process for an agency to process claims using invalid legal
standards. Virtually everyone perceives that this is circular. See, e.g., Maranville, supra note
19, at 519.
52 Coenen, supra note 19, at 1352 (footnote omitted).
53 Id. at 1352-53.
48

49
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But the equal protection objection to the practice of nonacquiescence has a deeper flaw: it assumes that the judicial understanding of
the law will necessarily be more favorable to indigent claimants than
the executive understanding of law, and thus that judicial understandings must always supersede executive understandings. This is not
necessarily the case. In the Labor Board context, for example, one
can easily imagine the agency adopting a national construction of the
labor laws that is more generous to workers than the understanding
adopted by one of the courts of appeals. 54 If this happens, does equal
protection still require that the agency acquiesce, and start applying
the restrictive judicial rule to other similarly situated persons in that
circuit? Or is the equal protection argument a one-way ratchet that
requires agencies to apply whatever happens to be the most favorable
law to those less well off'? If this is the implicit claim, then it amounts
to little more than the assertion that the government may not act in
ways that harm the poor-a proposition that has been rejected in
other contexts, 55 and should be either rejected or accepted on its own
merits, not in the guise of an argument about agency nonacquiescence.
Finally, both of my co-panelists offer a new theory in support of
the opinions-as-law understanding: they suggest that if judicial judgments are binding on the executive, it must follow as a matter of logic
that judicial precedent is binding on the executive too. 56 The reasons
for this claim, however, are obscure. Professor Paulsen, who develops
this idea at greatest length, seems to believe that either the power to
interpret law is shared equally by all three branches, or the judiciary's
interpretations must always trump the other branches-there are no
intermediate possibilities. 57 Thus, if one believes that the judiciary's
interpretation trumps the executive's in one context-when the judicial interpretation is embodied in a judgment-one must logically endorse the position that the judiciary's interpretation always trumps
the executive's.
The notion that the Constitution contains one or the other of
these extreme allocations of interpretative power is hardly self-evi5 4 See, e.g., Maranville, supra note 19, at 495-96. To be sure, in the Social Security context
when agency and circuit court precedent diverge, the judicial precedent will almost always
favor claimants. But this is because the only appeals taken from agency decisions are by disappointed claimants; the agency cannot appeal from ALJ decisions awarding benefits. This particular asymmetry in the Social Security context is not, however, an inherent feature of
nonacquiescence in general.
55 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. l, 28-29 (1973); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973).
5 6 See Paulsen, supra note 7, at 104-06; Strauss, supra note 7, at 123-25.
57 Paulsen, supra note 7, at 83-84, 100-01, 104-06, 109.
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dent. One can just as easily interpret the Constitution as adopting a
general default rule that each branch may interpret the law for itself,
subject to defeasance upon a showing that the interpretation is embodied in the exercise of a more specific power given exclusively to
one branch. 58 Further, one could construe the Constitution as conferring an exclusive power on the judiciary to render judgments binding
on actors in other branches. 59 This would mean that when the judiciary offers an interpretation embodied in a judgment, the other
branches may not question the judgment as contrary to law. Similarly, one could readily interpret the Constitution as giving the power
to veto legislation and to issue pardons exclusively to the President. 60
This would mean that even though the judiciary generally has the
power to interpret the law, it could not sit in review of a presidential
veto or a decision by the President to grant a pardon based on his
understanding of the requirements of the Constitution. 61
If the various arguments commonly advanced in support of opinions-as-law do not fare well under scrutiny, the claims usually asserted in support of the view that opinions are not binding on
executive actors are not terribly persuasive either. First, just as the
partisans of judicial power cite judicial authority in support of their
view (Marbury, Cooper), so the partisans of executive autonomy cite
presidential authority in support of theirs. Now, instead of the words
of Chief Justice Marshall, we are treated to quotations from Presidents Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and Andrew Jackson and
from presidential advisers like Roger Taney and Felix Frankfurter
(evidently thought to be particularly probative because they later be58 Cf Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993) (federal courts may not sit in review of
a legal determination by the Senate of what procedures may be applied in trying an
impeachment).
59 One would not have to go so far as to say only Article III courts may render judgments
or decide cases and controversies; it would be enough to posit that only Article III courts may
render judgments that bind both the executive and the legislative branches. Cf Freytag v.
Comm'r, 111 S. Ct. 2631 (1991) (Article I court may be considered a "Court of Law" for some
purposes).
60 The Supreme Court has stated that the Pardon Power belongs exclusively to the President, United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1872), and has implied that this
means that presidential pardons are not judicially reviewable on the merits. Id. at 148.
Although the Court has addressed questions dealing with the Constitution's procedures for
effectuating a presidential veto, see The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929); Wright v.
United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938), no attempt has been made to secure Supreme Court review
of the merits of a presidential veto, and any such attempts would almost certainly be rejected.
Cf Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993) (no judicial review of impeachment
procedures).
61 Thus, I also disagree with Professor Paulsen that if one takes the Cooper position of
judicial supremacy in matters of legal interpretation, one must logically conclude that the
judiciary may review presidential pardons. See Paulsen, supra note 7, at 100-03.
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came Justices!). 62 And for an emotively-laden historical example, to
be paired off against the Little Rock school desegregation controversy, we are offered the decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford 63 and the
arguments of Lincoln and others that the opinion did not preclude
Congress and the President from seeking to implement a contrary understanding of the Constitution.
The fact that the advocates of opinions-as-explanations can cite
extensive presidential authority and historical example in support of
their view tells us something-that reasonable people have been on
both sides of this issue. But the observation offered above about the
impropriety of resolving the issue by looking solely to the statements
of the Supreme Court is equally apposite here. If the question cannot
be resolved by a unilateral claim of judicial supremacy, neither can it
be resolved by unilateral assertions of executive autonomy.
Like their counterparts in the opinions-as-law camp, the proponents of the more modest view of judicial power also have an argument based on constitutional language: the description of the judicial
power as extending to various categories of "cases" and "controversies. " 64 The· inference that could be drawn from this, especially in
contrast to the vesting of "[a]ll legislative powers herein granted" 65 to
Congress, is that the federal courts are empowered only 'to decide
cases and controversies, not to make law. Thus, it could be maintained, it. is one thing for courts to interpret law in the course of deciding cases and controversies. It is quite another to suggest that the
understandings they derive in resolving these cases and controversies
are binding, as law, on actors in other branches.
Again, I do not quarrel with the premise of the argument-that
courts are empowered only to decide cases and controversies. 66 But it
is not inconsistent with this premise to argue that, as long as courts
limit their activity to the decision of cases and controversies, the legal
understandings that emerge as a by-product of that process are binding on the other branches. Indeed, the allocation of power to decide
cases and controversies could be consistent with a variety of understandings. It could mean that judicial judgments will be enforced by
the other branches only if they agree with the legal and factual basis
of those judgments (Paulsen's "Merryman power"). Or, it could
mean that judicial judgments are binding on other branches, but judi. 62 Nearly all the relevant sources are collected in THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, supra note
18, and in FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 18, at 16-21.
63 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
64 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
65 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
66 See Merrill, supra note 46, at 240 (footnote omitted).
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cial precedents are not. Or, it could mean that both judgments and
precedents are binding on other branches (the Cooper position). The
point is that any one of these three possibilities is consistent with the
allocation of power to the judiciary to decide cases and controversies.
The effect of that allocation of power must be resolved by means other
than an analysis of the constitutional text.
Some defenders of agency nonacquiescence have also offered a
sophisticated argument grounded in the Supreme Court's recognition
of the inappropriateness of subjecting the executive branch to nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel. In United States v. Mendoza, 67
the Court held in effect that when party A prevails on a question of
law in the case of United States v. A, nonparty B may not come along
in a subsequent case and bar the government from relitigating the issue on grounds of estoppel. The Court noted that "[a] rule allowing
nonmutual collateral estoppel against the Government in such cases
would substantially thwart the development of important questions. of
law by freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular legal
issue. " 68 Freezing the law in this fashion, the Court added, would
frustrate the Court's own policy of allowing legal issues to percolate
in the lower courts to see if a circuit conflict develops before granting
certiorari, and would effectively require the Solicitor General to authorize appeals from every district court decision adverse to the
government. 69
Supporters of agency nonacquiescence have argued that Mendoza's emphasis on the importance of allowing the government to relitigate questions of law in multiple forums supports the conclusion
that the executive is not bound by judicial opinions. But this too does
not follow. 70 A rule of nonmutual collateral estoppel would bind the
government in any court in which the United States appears. Thus, a
district court decision in the Northern District of California would
bind the government in a future proceeding in the District Court for
the District of Columbia-or indeed in the Supreme Court. A rule
that required the executive to abide by judicial constructions of law,
in contrast, would presumably extend only to the jurisdiction of the
court that rendered the decision. Thus, an opinion by the District
Court of the Northern District of California would be binding only in
that district, and would leave the executive free to argue for a different
result in the District of Columbia. Similarly, a decision by the Ninth
464 U.S. 154 (1984).
Id. at 160.
69 Id. at 161.
10 See Coenen, supra note 19, at 1372.
67

68
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Circuit would· be binding only in the States covered by the Ninth Circuit, and so forth. Thus, accepting the position that judicial opinions
are law woµld not preclude the relitigation in multiple forums and
percolation of views that the Supreme Gourt sought to preserve in
Mendoza. 71
·
There is a fl.rial source of argumentation employed in ·opposite
and symmetrical fashion by both camps (particularly in the nonacquiescence debate) that I find unsatisfying. This suggests that the proper
analysis of the question varies with the level of court one is considering. Partisans of opinions-as-binding-law like to dwell on the
Supreme Court, insisting that Supreme Court opinions be regarded as
binding on all the world, then assimilating this understanding to the
opinions of the courts of appeals, but avoiding any suggestion that
district court opinions.be regarded like statutes. 72 Partisans of opinions-as-explanations, on the other hand, prefer to start by noting the
incongruity of any suggestion that . executive actors are bound by
statements of law uttered by individual district judges, stressing the
parallels with respect to decisions of courts of appeals, and then softpedalling or conceding away the situation once the issue reaches the
Supreme Court. 73
The problem with both arguments, to paraphrase Gertrude Stein,
is that a court is a court is a court. The Supreme Court, th~ courts of
appeals, and the district courts all ·exercise the same constitutional
power-the judicial. power-and .all conduct their affairs in fundamentally similar ways. They consider cases between adversely situated parties, render judgments on the pleadings· arid the record, and
resolve disputes about the meaning of the law using the same· techniques of interpretation and precedent. There are a number of practical differences between courts at different levels in the judicial system,
such as the number of judges who hear a given c~se, their average age
and experience, and (perhaps) their level of competence. 74 But these
are at most differences in degree, and would not seem to justify treat11 Although eliminating nonacquiescence would not end "percolation," it nevertheless
· could subtly alter the dynamics of the process. See Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz,
The Uneasy Case Against Intracircuit Nonacquiescence: A Reply, 99 YALE L.J. 831, 835 (1990)
(noting that rule forbidding intracircuit nonacquiescence would bar agencies from relitigating
in a circuit but would not prevent relitigation by private claimants, thus creating a "one-way
ratchet effect" that would "skew[] the law's development in a direction that is always antagonistic ·to the agency's position").
72 See, e.g., Diller & Morawetz, supra note 30, at 822-23.
73 See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 19, at 723-25 (assuming that Supreme Court opinions are binding on "all within the regulatory reach of federal law" and stating that the key
question is "whether the courts of appeals should be treated like the Supreme Court").
74 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 79 (1990).
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ing the work product of courts at different levels in the judicial hierarchy as imposing a fundamentally different obligation on the executive
branch. Thus, in the balance of the paper I shall seek arguments that
would support either the opinions-as-law or the opinions-as-explanations views, regardless of the identity of the court rendering the
opinion.

Ill.

COHERENTIST CONSIDERATIONS

The conventional arguments about whether executive actors are
bound by judicial precedent-arguments based on invocations of authority, analysis of constitutional text, and distinctions between courts
at different levels in the judicial hierarchy-·all fall apart on close
analysis. In effect, these arguments presuppose the answer to the underlying question at issue: what is the nature of the obligation that
members of the executive branch have to judicial opinions? In this
section and the next, I will seek to answer this underlying question
using somewhat different methods of analysis. First, I will discuss
what might be called coherentist considerations: which view about the
interbranch effect of judicial precedent rests inost comfortably within
the general web of conventional understandings about American public law? In the next section, I will review some consequentialist arguments that might support either the opinions-as-binding-law or the
opinions-as-explanations understandings.
A.

Three Conceptions of Interbranch Obligation to Judicial
Opinions

Before considering the fit between different assumptions about
the executive duty to judicial opinions and other conventional understandings, it is important to extract and clarify the different conceptions of obligation to judicial precedent that underlie the competing
positions. As far as I am aware, virtually no consideration has been
given to this question in the literature on judicial precedent.
Although there is a growing body of work discussing the nature of the
obligation that courts owe to precedent established by other courts, 75
virtually no analysis has been directed to different possible conceptions of the obligation that nonjudicial actors owe to judicial
precedent.
75 See generally RUPERT CROSS & J.W. HARRIS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW (4th ed.
1991); Michael Moore, Precedent, Induction and Ethical Generalization, in PRECEDENT IN
LAW 183-213 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987); RICHARD A. W ASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL
DECISION (1961); Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 s. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1989);
Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987).
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At least implicit in the debate over executive autonomy in interpretation are three disparate understandings of nonjudicial obligation
to judicial precedent. The first two support the strong opinions-asbinding-law assumption; the third supports the weak opinions-as-explanations-for-judgments position.
First, there is the position that from the perspective of nonjudicial actors, judicial precedent interpreting enacted law partakes of the
same status as the instrument being construed. This appears to be the
view implicit in Cooper v. Aaron. 76 In other words, from the perspective of nonjudicial actors, judicial understandings of enacted law are
in effect incorporated into enacted law, like a covenant runniqg with
the land. 77 Since it is universally recognized that the President and
his agents have a legal obligation to enforce enacted law, 78 the incorporation of judicial understandings into enacted · law would make
these understandings equally obligatory on the executive. A judicial
interpretation of the Constitution would become part of the Constitution for nonjudicial actors; a judicial interpretation of a statute would
become part of the statute, and so forth.
A second and distinct understandil)g is that the complex of
norms known as stare decisis-nonns grounded in legal convention
rather than positive law-extends notjust horizontally among courts
over time, and vertically from higher courts to lower courts in a given
judicial hierarchy, but also applies across branches of the government. 79 This appears to be the dominant theory implicit in the discussion of intracircuit nonacquiescence. 80 Specifically, the theory would
seek to assimilate the norms of vertical stare decisis to the relationship
between courts and actors in other branches of government. Thus,
just as the Supreme Court has announced that under vertical stare
decisis the courts of appeals are strictly bound to follow Supreme
76 358 U.S. 1 (1958). The Court reasoned that (1) the Constitution is the supreme law of
the land; (2) the Supreme Court is "supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution";
and therefore (3) the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution is also "the supreme
law of the land." Id. at 18.
77 Edward Corwin adopted a religious metaphor to capture the idea: "The juristic conception of judicial review invokes a miracle. It supposes a kind of transubstantiation whereby the
Court's opinion of its Constitution ... becomes [the] very body and blood of the Constitution."
CORWIN, supra note 26, at 68.
7 8 See generally Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 CoLUM.
L. REV. l, 24-32 (1993).
79 I have borrowed the useful nomenclature distinguishing between horizontal ·and vertical
precedent from Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. &
Pue. PoL'Y (forthcoming 1993).
80 See, e.g., Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 71, at 832; Maranville, supra note 19, at 499509; William W. Buzbee, Note, Administrative Agency /ntracircuit Nonacquiescence, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 582, 595-97 (1985).
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Court precedents unless and until they have been overruled by the
Supreme Court itself, 81 so the executive branch (and other nonjudicial
actors) would be regarded as strictly bound to follow all judicial
precedents unless and until overruled by the rendering court itself.
This theory results in roughly the same conclusion as the incorporation theory-nonjudicial actors are bound by legal precedent-but
reaches that result through a very different route.
A third conception rejects both the idea that judicial precedent is
incorporated into the instrument being construed, and the idea that
something like vertical stare decisis extends outside the judicial
branch to executive actors. Instead, it in effect adopts Justice
Holmes's "predictive theory" of law. 82 Insofar as nonjudicial actors
are concerned, judicial opinions are simply explanations for judgments-essays written by judges explaining why they rendered the
judgment they did. The primary significance of these essays for nonjudicial actors is the guidance they provide in predicting future judicial behavior. But the understanding of the law found in judicial
opinions is not regarded as ·legally binding on these nonjudicial actors-at least not in the strong sense that the Constitution and federal
statutes are binding on such actors, or that the precedent of a superior
court is binding on a lower court.

B.

The Incorporation Conception

Which of these three conceptions of nonjudicial obligation to judicial precedent best conforms with other conventional understandings of the American legal system? I will consider first
incorporation-the idea that judicial decisions construing the mean81 See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1989);
Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535 (1983); Hutto v.
Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982).
82 See Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897) ("The
prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean
by the law."). For a sophisticated defense, see Anthony D'Amato, The Limits of Legal Real·
ism, 87 YALE L.J. 468 (1978). Note that endorsing the predictive theory as an account of how
executive actors should view judicial precedent would not commit one to endorse the predictive theory for other purposes. For example, one could reject the predictive theory as an account of how judges themselves should understand the law, or as an account of how executive
actors (and others) should understand enacted law as opposed to judicial precedent. Whatever
problems the predictive theory has in other contexts, however, it works reasonably well as an
account of how a practicing lawyer understands judicial precedent in advising a client. See
Jack M. Balkin, Coherence and Legal Understanding (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (arguing that the predictive theory oflaw may be better suited to understanding law as
a practical activity); William Twining, The Bad Man Revisited, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 275, 281,
285-93 (1973). This of course is essentially the way a lawyer in the executive branch regards
judicial precedent in advising the President or an executive agency.
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ing of enacted law enter into and assume the authority of the instrument being construed. Several features of American jurisprudence
suggest that this is an incongruous way of understanding judicial
opinions.
First, although judicial precedents are commonly regarded as reflecting or expounding legal rules, 83 they are rules of a very different
sort than those we associate with enacted law. Unlike enacted lawthe Constitution, statutes, and treaties of the United States-the rules
associated with judicial precedent generally have no "canonical formulation";84 they are "implicit rather than explicit rules." 85 Indeed,
with rare exceptions (Roe v. Wade, 86 Miranda v. Arizona 81--0ecisions
which are controversial precisely because they do prescribe explicit
rules), opinions do not lay down the law. In this sense it seems anomalous to say that judicial understandings of enacted law are incorporated into and have a status on a par with the underlying instrument
being construed.
Second and relatedly, because judicial opinions articulate only
implicit rules, they are in a near-constant state of evolution. The proponents of the Cooper v. Aaron view generally admit that dictum in
judicial opinions is not binding, only the "holding" is binding. 88 (One
of the many ironies here is that the assertion in Cooper that Supreme
Court opinions are binding was itself dictum, and hence on this understanding is not binding.) But as every first year law student is
taught, the distinction between dictum and holding is extremely manipulable, and allows the implicit rule reflected in judicial precedent
to be changed in subsequent cases. 89 To assert that executive actors
are bound by this judicially-created moving target to the same extent
See Alexander, supra note 75.
Stephen R. Perry, Judicial Obligation, Precedent and the Common Law, 7 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 215, 241 (1987).
85 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis, 19 J.L. & EcoN. 249, 249 (1976).
86 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
87 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
88 E.g., Neuborne, supra note 27, at 377. This of course is the received view about the
binding effect of judicial opinions within the judicial branch. See Max Radin, Case Law and
Stare Decisis: Concerning Prajudizienrecht in Amerika, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 210 (1933).
89 For example, what is the holding of Roe v. Wade? That state statutes criminalizing
abortion are unconstitutional (as suggested by Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 521 (1989))? That abortion must be permitted up to the point offetal viability (as suggested by the joint opinion in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2804 (1992))7 That abortion is a fundamental right which can be
regulated only to achieve a compelling governmental interest (as indicated by. most post-Roe
decisions prior to Casey)?
83

84
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as they are bound by the underlying instrument seems troubling, and
very likely productive of considerable mischief.
Third, it is not uncommon to read or hear comments to the effect
that judicial decisions construing the Constitution are "inconsistent
with the Constitution; " 90 or that judicial decisions interpreting a statute are "contrary to the statute." 91 Implicit in these statements is the
understanding that there is a distinction between enacted law and judicial interpretations of enacted law, and that enacted law is a standard or criterion by which judicial interpretations can be judged or
measured. 92 This understanding is quite incongruous with a theory
that assimilates judicial understandings of the law to the law itself.
Fourth, the idea that judicial precedents are incorporated into
enacted law is hard to reconcile with the fact that judicial opinions do
not result in any change in the codification of enacted law. The most
striking illustration of this occurs when a court declares a statute unconstitutional. The effect of the decision is not to require that the
statutory provision be erased from the books, replaced perhaps with a
notation "declared unconstitutional in Smith v. Jones." Instead, statutory provisions that have been declared unconstitutional remain part
of the code unless or until repealed by the legislature. Indeed, if a
provision is not repealed by the legislature, and the court later
changes its mind about the meaning of the Constitution, the provision
in question becomes again as fully effective and enforceable in court as
if it had never been questioned. 93 All of which suggests that judicial
decisions do not, at least in any ordinary sense, act on or qualify enacted law.
Fifth, the view that judicial expositions of enacted law are incorporated into that law is hard to square with the understanding90 See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 86 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Court's
decision "inconsistent with the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection of the laws").
91 See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 216
(1979) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (Court reaches judgment "contrary to the explicit language of
the statute").
92 See, e.g., Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) ("the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not
what we have said about it").
·
93 This in fact occurred in 1937 when the Supreme Court, in West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), overruled its prior decision in Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261
U.S. 525 (1923), which had in turn declared a minimum wage law in the District of Columbia
unconstitutional. The Attorney General opined that after the 1937 ruling, the District statute
would again be enforced, noting: "The decisions are practically in accord in holding that the
courts have no power to repeal or abolish a statute, and that notwithstanding a decision holding it unconstitutional a statute continues to remain on the statute books." 39 Op. Att'y Gen.
22, 22-23 (1937). The District of Columbia courts agreed. Jawish v. Morlet, 86 A.2d 96, 96
(D.C. 1952).
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which constitutes part of the American doctrine of horizontal stare
decisis-that these expositions are not binding in the same sense on
the court that renders them. Although horizontal stare decisis creates
a strong presumption that prior judicial articulations of the law are
correct and should generally be followed by the rendering court, the
rule is far from absolute. The Supreme Court, for example, often
overrules its prior decisions construing the Constitution, and also
(although less often) overrules prior decisiQns construing federal statutes. 94 If, as Cooper v. Aaron suggests, Supreme Court opinions become part of "the supreme law of the land," it is hard to see h<Jw this
is possible95-unless the Court is seen as a kind of interstitial legislature, adopting "legislative rules" binding on all the world but open to
modification by the Court itself in future cases. Even administrative
agencies that have been expressly delegated authority to adopt legislative rules are not thought to have such power. 9 ~
Sixth, if Supreme Court opinions partake of the authority of the
instrument construed, ii is hard .to see how the Solicitor General (or
indeed any litigant) could ever argue that Supreme Court decisions
should be overruled. Yet virtually everyone seems to agree that it is
proper for the Solicitor General to urge the Court to overrule its prior
decisions97-at least no one argues it was improper to urge the overruling of the separate-but-equal doctrine in Brown v. Board of Education. 98 . Again, this practice can be reconciled with the understanding
that judicial opinions are incorporated into enacted law only if we
assume that the Supreme Court is an interstitial legislature-an as- .
sumption which is itself contrary to the common understanding.
C.

The Expanded Stare ,Pecisis Theory

If the incorporation theory seems inconsistent with a number of
established legal conventions, what about the theory that principles of
stare decisis-in particular, the strong vertical version of stare deci9 4 See generally William Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361,
1427-29 (1988) (listing overruling decisions).
95 Meese, supra note 27, at 983.
96 Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988). .
97 But see Arthur S. Miller, The President and Faithful Execution of the Laws, 40 VAND. L.
REV. 389, 396 (1987) (arguing that the President should not be regarded as having authority to
file briefs urging that federal statutes be held unconstitutional, but admitting that the Supreme
Court a~pts the practice as legitimate).
9 8 347 U.S. 483 (1988). In his book about the Solicitor General, Lincoln Caplan suggests
that it was improper for Solicitor General Fried ~o ask the Court to overrule Roe v. Wade.
LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SoLiCITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW
135-154 (1987). However, Caplan makes no such point in discussing the Solicitor General's
role in the overruling of Plessy v. Ferguson in the Brown case. See id. at 26-27.
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sis-extend beyond the judicial branch and apply also to nonjudicial
actors? This idea also seems hard to square with several received
understandings.
First and perhaps most fundamentally, to posit that nonjudicial
actors are generally bound by judicial precedent is inconsistent with
established tenets of res judicata. 99 A fundamental assumption of Anglo-American law is that the only authority courts have legally to
bind nonjudicial actors is their power to enter judgments establishing
the legal rights and obligations of the parties before them. Nonjudicial actors who are not parties or in privity with a party to a judicial
judgment are not regarded as being legally bound by the court's decision. 100 Thus, if someone defies a legal interpretation embodied in a
judgment to which he is a party, an opposing party can bring an action for contempt or for execution on the judgment, in which the legal
views of the rendering court cannot be revisited. In contrast, if someone defies a legal interpretation reflected in a judicial decision to
which he is not a party, then an adversary must bring an entirely new
proceeding to secure judicial relief, and the nonparty will be free in
the new proceeding to raise any and all arguments in support of a
contrary interpretation of law. 10 i To assert that courts have the
power to bind nonparties to their view of law under norms equivalent
to those of vertical stare decisis would eradicate this basic distinction.
Second, the concept of interbranch stare decisis would appear to
violate current received understandings of procedural due process.
According to venerable authority, due process permits legislative bodies to make law binding upon persons who have not been given personal notice or a right to be heard, because we assume their interests
have been adequately represented through the electoral process. 102
On the other hand, when courts and other adjudicative tribunals
"make law" in a way that adversely affects individual citizens, due
process requires that those who are adversely affected be given advance notice and an opportunity to be heard. 103 The suggested extension of stare decisis to nonjudicial actors would offer the protections
99 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 111 (1975); Philip B. Kurland, "Brown v. Board of Education Was the Beginning"-The School Desegregation Cases in
the United States Supreme Court: 1954-1979, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 309, 327.
100 See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
101 See BICKEL, supra note 99, at 111.
102 Bi-MetaJlic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Colo., 239 U.S. 441 (1915); cf
Londoner v. City & Cty. of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) (holding that decision affecting small
numbers of persons on individual grounds requires individual hearing).
103 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); see Samuel lssacharoff, When Substance Mandates Procedure: Martin v. Wilks and the Rights of Vested
Incumbents in Civil Rights Consent Decrees, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 189, 226-30 (1992); Larry
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of neither of these two regimes. Under this interbranch stare decisis,
adjudicative tribunals could make law that binds nonparties even
though their interests have not been represented through elections
and they have not received notice or an opportunity to be heard.
Third and relatedly, the suggested expansion of stare decisis
would be hard to reconcile with the procedural rules associated with
class actions. As Professor Arthur S. Miller has candidly observed,
the conception of judicial authority endorsed in Cooper v. Aaron
makes every judicial judgment a "de facto class action." 104 In contrast to a class action, however, this binding effect is achieved without
complying with any of the notice or representation safeguards of Rule
23. 105 The class action analogy thus underscores the difficulty of
squaring the interbranch stare decisis theory with traditional norms of
procedural fairness.
Fourth, the view that agencies are bound by judicial precedent to
the same extent as lower courts overlooks some important differences
between agencies and courts. For example, agencies enjoy
prosecutorial discretion, and often decide not to investigate or challenge conduct that may violate the judicial understanding of what the
law requires. 106 These discretionary determinations have been
thought to be unreviewable. 107 But if agencies are legally bound to
follow ·the understanding of law set forth in judicial precedent, it is
hard to see how this is possible; any decision by the agency to stay its
hand for discretionary reasons would appear to violate its duty to
abide by judicially-articulated understandings of law.

D.

The Predictive Theory

What I have called the predictive theory avoids the foregoing
anomalies associated with the incorporation and interbranch stare decisis arguments. Nevertheless, the coherentist considerations do not
run entirely one way. In perhaps the most fully developed effort to
defend the Cooper v. Aaron understanding of the binding force of judicial opinions, Professor Dan Farber has suggested several anomalies
associated with the contrary view. 108
First, it is admittedly common for legal actors "to speak of cases
Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights of Third Parties, 87 MICH. L. REV. 321, 345-49
(1988).
104 Arthur S. Miller, Constitutional Decisions as De Facto Class Actions: A Comment on the
Implications of Cooper v. Aaron, 58 U. DET. J. URB. L. 573, 574 (1981).
105 FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
106 Maranville, supra note 19, at 507-08.
101 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
10s Farber, supra note 43, at 405-11.
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as embodying rules of law." 109 Executive branch lawyers, in particular, write preambles to regulations, prepare adjudicatory orders, draft
legal opinions, and author memoranda providing internal advice to
superiors. In each context, they make frequent reference to judicial
opinions and treat them as if they embody rules of law that constrain
the executive. 110 This established and routine practice seems hard to
square with the idea that the executive is legally bound only by judicial judgments, not opinions.
Second, what about the common law? As Professor Farber observes, the notion that judicial opinions do not state rules of law binding on nonjudicial actors flies in the face of the understanding that the
Rule Against Perpetuities and the various rules of contract are regarded as binding rules oflaw. 111 Indeed, the Erie doctrine• 12 rests on
the assumption that the term "law" includes common law, and that
federal courts are bound by the articulation of common law reflected
in state supreme court opinions. 113
Third, Farber observes that we not only have the example of ordinary Erie-style common law, we also have the more exotic species
that goes by the name "federal common law." 114 This is a form of
common law articulated by federal courts in cases where enacted law
provides no rule of decision but federal interests seem to require a
federal rule. 115 The resulting rules, which are wholly the creation of
the federal courts, are regarded as binding not only within the federal
judicial system but also on state courts. Based on the Supreme
Court's occasional endorsement of this form of common law, Farber
has suggested that we can perhaps rescue Cooper by saying that even
if the understanding of law set forth in judicial opinions is not binding
in the same way a statute or a judgment is binding, it is still binding
on the executive and other non parties as a form of "federal common
law." 116
These observations carry some force, and suggest that any analysis of the relative coherence of the competing theories is far from
Id. at 408 (footnote omitted).
See Geoffrey P. Miller, The President's Power of Constitutional Interpretation: Implications of a Unified Theory of Constitutional Law, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming
Autumn 1993) (manuscript at 26, on file with author).
111 Farber, supra note 43, at 408.
112 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
113 See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2620 (1992) ("At least since Erie
R. v. Tompkins [sic] ... we have recognized the phrase 'state law' to include common law as
well as statutes and regulations." (citation omitted)).
114 Farber, supra note 43, at 410-11.
115 See generally Merrill, supra note SO.
116 Farber, supra note 43, at 390, 410.
109
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wholly one-sided. Or to put it differently, they suggest that there is no
single theory of the nonjudicial obligation to judicial precedent that
coheres perfectly with the larger universe of legal understandings.
Still, I think that the anomalies associated with the prediction theory
are somewhat less glaring than those that inhere in the incorporation
and expanded stare decisis theories.
To begin with, the fact that executive branch lawyers speak of
judicial decisions as stating rules of law, and that our legal system
recognizes something called common law, is not necessarily inconsistent with the prediction theory. 117 The prediction theory, after all,
originated as an account of what it means to speak of "the law." 118
Thus, it would not be at all unusual under this theory for executive
lawyers to refer to Supreme Court opinions as law, since these opinions provide important data about how courts will resolve like controversies in the future. Similarly, it would not be at all strange for
executive lawyers to speak of "the common law," since the perceived
doctrinal regularities that go by that name are also predictive of future judicial judgments. What would be truly anomalous under the
prediction theory would be for a lawyer in the executive branch to
advise the President that a Supreme Court decision is the law, even
though the Court has made clear that the decision will no longer be
followed. However, I doubt that this happens very often.
Furthermore, Farber's attempt to rescue Cooper by calling judicial understandings of the Constitution "federal common law" creates
serious anomalies of its own. Federal common law is understood to
be subject to modification by Congress. 119 But judicial understandings of the Constitution are not subject to revision by legislative majorities-at least that is the view of the courts. 120 Thus, if Cooper can
be reconciled with our ordinary understandings of the legal status of
judicial opinions only by reconceptualizing judicial opinions as federal
common law, the rescue would come at the price of radically changing the relative balance of power b~tween the courts and Congress in
interpreting the Constitution. Indeed, reconceiving Supreme Court
opinions construing the Constitution as federal common law would
probably alter the balance of power among the branches much more
Farber in fact recognizes this. Id. at 408.
See POSNER, supra note 74, at 221-28 nn.2-10.
119 City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
120 Some constitutional doctrine--most prominently the Dormant Commerce Clause--is
subject to congressional revision. But this is exceptional. See Henry P. Monaghan, The
Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1975).
111
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radically than any change that would come about through universal
recognition of the validity of the predictive theory.

IV.

CONSEQUENTIALIST CONSIDERATIONS

In addition to coherentist considerations, it is also important to
weigh the practical consequences of adopting an opinions-as-law theory (in either its incorporation or interbranch stare decisis versions)
or an opinions-as-explanations understanding. Most significantly,
what would be the consequences of adopting one or the other of these
understandings for the balance of power among the branches, and in
particular, for the functioning of the judiciary?
A.

The Marginal Nature of the Consequences

The first point to make is that whichever assumption we adopt
about the executive obligation toward judicial precedent, it will probably not radically change the legal system. To put things in context, it
is useful to begin by contrasting the practical significance of the two
points of consensus about executive-judicial relations mentioned at
the beginning of part I. One point of general agreement, it will be
recalled, is that executive actors have autonomous power to construe
statutes in advance of any consideration by courts. The second point
of consensus is that executive actors have a duty to enforce final judicial judgments, even if they disagree with their legal bases. In either
case, adopting a contrary understanding would produce a major disruption in the existing balance of power among the branches.
What would happen if agencies had no authority to construe the
statutes they are charged with administering, but instead had to rely
on the judiciary to resolve all questions of interpretation? Quite simply, executive agencies would become little more than adjuncts to
courts. The vision of court-agency relations spelled out in Crowell v.
Benson 121 for the adjudication of private rights-a vision in which
courts decide all issues of law de novo and the agency is confined to
applying judicial understandings of law to particular factual circumstances 122-would become the general model for all of administrative
law. Obviously, this would entail a fundamental transformation of
the American legal system. As Professor Strauss notes, under current
arrangements executive actors decide far more issues of law than
courts. 123 Stripping executive agencies of any power to engage in autonomous interpretation would reverse this relationship, and create a
121

285 U.S. 22 (1932).

122

Id. at 51.
Strauss, supra note 7, at 114. ·.

123
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huge judicial bureaucracy dominating the executive both in terms of
numbers and authority.
·
On the other hand, if Professor Paulsen's "Merryman power" 124
came to replace the current understanding that the executive must
obey judicial judgments, we would see something of a reverse transformation. If the executive could sit in review of judicial judgments,
the judiciary would be reduced to an adjunct of the executive branch.
Instead of the three-branch system of government created by the Constitution, we would have in effect a two-branch system, with the executive serving as both prosecutor and court of last resort. It is true, as
Professor Paulsen notes, that under this arrangement the judiciary
would still have its independence, and its judgments would therefore
carry "moral (and consequently political) force." 125 But a judiciary
that must rely solely upon the moral authority that comes from being
independent would have no more clout than, say, a panel of academics or the National Academy of Sciences. This would clearly represent a radical transformation in the current balance of power among
the branches-one that most observers would find alarming because it
would eliminate the major check on abuses of executive power. 126
When we tum from these areas of consensus 127 to the point of
controversy-whether nonjudicial actors should regard judicial opinions as binding law or as mere explanations for judgments-we find,
happily, that the consequences of adopting one characterization or the
other are less earth-shattering. The choice is not between judicial primacy in interpretation of law and complete independent judgment by
the executive. Rather, it is between the view that the executive is
bound by judicial judgments and has a duty to follow judicial precedent, and the view that the executive is bound by judicial judgments
but should regard judicial opinions only as predictive of future judiPaulsen, supra note 7, at 84.
Id. at 103 n.74.
126 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and
Article III, IOI HARV. L. REV. 916, 978 (1988); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation
and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 CoLUM. L. REV. 452, 467-99 (1989).
121 I also think it would be unwise to advocate a change in the current understandingreflected in the doctrine of vertical stare decisis-that lower courts are bound to follow the
precedents of higher courts. One problem is that the highest court in the federal system, the
Supreme Court, has a very limited capacity to correct judgments rendered by the courts of
appeals. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the
Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
1093 (1987). Another problem is that higher courts have relatively few remedies available to
them to sanction lower court judges who repeatedly stray from the party line. Executive
branch officers can be held in check by the threat of Bivens actions, see infra note 129 and
accompanying text, exclusionary rules, awards of attorneys fees, and so forth; lower court
judges would be controlled only by the threat to their reputations from being overruled.
124
12s
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cial judgments. 128
Under either conception, as long as the executive must faithfully
execute final judicial judgments, courts will exert considerable influence over the executive. Even if judicial opinions are not binding,
they are probably the best source of information for predicting what
judgments courts will enter in future cases. And the prospect of future adverse judgments can be a very powerful constraining force.
For example, if the courts have announced that a Bivens action 129 for
damages will lie against executive officials for the violation of constitutional or statutory rights, then executive actors can predict what
will happen if they transgress clearly established 130 judicial precedent:
they will be sued, a judgment for damages will be awarded against
them, and the executive will be obliged to enforce that judgment. Obviously, this creates a considerable incentive to adhere to the judicial
understanding of law. 131 Similar points can be made about judicial
understandings enforced by exclusionary rules, or judicial understandings that give rise to awards of attorneys fees under the Equal
Access to Justice Act (payable out of agency appropriations) 132 if the
executive does not conform to the judicial view.
Moreover, even in circumstances where executive officials are not
12s There is one possible circumstance in which the executive should have the power to
disregard judicial judgments under the opinions-as-explanations view: when a court enters an
injunction ordering the executive to obey judicial precedent. This has come close to happening. See Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp. 26 (C.D. Cal.), stay denied, 713 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir.),
partial stay granted, 463 U.S. 1328 (Rehnquist, C. J.), motion to vacate stay denied, 464 U.S.
879 (1983), dist. ct. aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir.), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 469 U.S. 1082 (1984); Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), vacated sub nom. Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986). If the
correct understanding of the balance of power between the branches is that the executive is
bound to enforce judicial judgments but not judicial precedent, the courts cannot unilaterally
alter this understanding by transforming their precedents into judgments.
129 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
130 In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982), the Court held that executive officials
performing discretionary functions "generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known."
131 It does not follow, as Professors Strauss and Farber suggest, that Bivens actions and
Section 1983 liability (with respect to state officials) support the view that judicial understandings of law are directly binding on nonjudicial actors. See Strauss, supra note 7, at 123; Farber, supra note 43, at 405-08. The availability of these remedies is consistent with the
understanding that courts regard judicial understandings of the Constitution as binding, and
will enter monetary judgments against governmental officers pursuant to this view. But from
the officers' perspective these understandings may be viewed simply as an incentive to abide by
the judicial understanding-based on a prediction of future adverse consequences resulting
from disobedience. They need not be subjectively perceived by governmental officers as correct understandings of law, or as imposing a direct legal obligation of obedience.
132 See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(4) (1988).
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directly constrained by the prospect of future adverse judgments,
there are powerful institutional incentives to avoid prolonged periods
of conflict with the courts. As the nonacquiescence controversies of
the 1980s reveal, a policy of executive nonacquiescence will lend a
sharp edge to court-agency relations. If there is no visible movement
on the agency's part to seek Supreme Court review or legislative clarification, courts are apt to become irritated and suspect game playing.
Agency lawyers, berated at oral argument and chastised in· strident
opinions for the agency's behavior, will quickly lose the stomach to
persist in enforcing the agency interpretation. ~ventually, the agency
will cave in and accept the judicial understanding. 133
Conversely, one should not exaggerate the additional power that
flows to the judiciary under the assumption that its decisions are binding law. If the political branches strongly disagree with the judicial
understanding, it will be ignored or distinguished or limited to its
facts. As Alexander Bickel observed:
Any rule of constitutional law not put into effect voluntarily by
officials and other persons who acquiesce in it, or not taken up by
legislation and made more effective by administrative or noncoercive means-any such rule is not in our system an effective rule of
law. If there is widespread nonobservance, the resources neither of
private litigating initiative nor of the judicial process as such are
equal to making it effective. 134
A recent empirical study tends to confirm this observation. 135
Thus, whichever understanding of the nonjudicial obligation to
judicial opinions we adopt, it will not have a decisive impact on the
balance of power between courts and agencies. The effects will be at
the margins, as the economists like to say. Still, adopting one understanding rather than the other will have implications both for the
scope of the respective spheres of judicial and executive interpretation, and for the style of judicial interpretation. Generally speaking,
133 This is roughly the story of the Social Security Administration's experience with the
Second Circuit's "treating physician" rule. See Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (enjoining agency to acquiesce in circuit precedent on treating physician testimony), vacated sub nom. Stieberger v.. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986); Stieberger v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding that agency had still not completely acquiesced
in circuit precedent spelling out treating physician rule); Settlement Agreement, 57 Fed. Reg.
43,006 (1992) (announcing settlement requiring all agency adjudicators at all hearing levels to
apply circuit precedent dealing with treating physician issue in good faith).
134 BICKEL, supra note 99, at 111. Accord Miller & Scheflin, supra note 26, at 288-92.
135 GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (Benjamin I. Page ed., 1991). For a balanced review, see Neal Devins, Judicial
Matters, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1027 (1992) (reviewing ROSENBERG, supra). See also Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. ·577 (1993) (arguing that courts are
much more majoritarian than is commonly supposed).
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the scope implications tend to favor an opinions-as-binding-law understanding; the style implications, which I regard as more important,
favor the idea that opinions are explanations for judgments.

B. Implications for the Relative Scope of Judicial and Executive
Interpretation
Adopting an opinions-as-binding-law understanding would expand the scope of judicial control over interpretation relative to that
of the executive. In effect, the realm of executive autonomy would be
confined to the period of time between enactment of a law and when a
court first speaks to an issue. At that point, the agency would be
obligated to adopt the judicial understanding, at least within the territorial jurisdiction of the court that renders the decision. There are
two reasons why this expansion of judicial authority over interpretation may be thought to have desirable consequences. 136
First, expansion of judicial control would likely result in greater
uniformity in federal law. This conclusion is somewhat uncertain because it depends on empirical assumptions about how executive agencies will go about implementing a policy of automatic acquiescence in
judicial rulings. A policy of automatic acquiescence would always result in greater uniformity within a circuit; there will be no disparity
between those who appeal the agency view and those who don't. 137
Whether such a policy results in greater uniformity between circuits
depends on how long the agency adheres to its understanding in circuits where it has not yet been judicially disapproved. 138 On the plausible assumption that agencies will not want to maintain two sets of
136 Dan Coenen lists eight practical consequences favoring judicial supremacy over an un·
derstanding that would permit agency nonacquiescence. Coenen, supra note 19, at 1402-12.
Some of these, such as the need to bolster the authority of the courts, beg the question; others,
such as the unfairness of nonacquiescence, have been addressed elsewhere. See supra text accompanying notes 51-55. Coenen also suggests that agencies are more susceptible to capture
by narrowly concentrated interests than are courts. Coenen, supra note 19, at 1408. This may
be generally true. There is, however, also a danger of judicial "capture," at least in the sense
that the litigation process may systematically favor certain claimants relative to others. See
generally Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 66-87 (1991). With respect to the Social Security disability program,
for example, courts may give excessive weight to extending additional benefits to particular
claimants, in part because they only see cases appealed by disappointed claimants and the
benefits to the claimant are immediately visible to the court. The costs of additional awards, in
contrast, which may affect other program beneficiaries and taxpayers, will be spread over the
entire system and hence will be largely invisible to the courts. In this context then, it is plausible to argue that courts are more susceptible to special pleading by a narrow concentrated
interest (disability plaintiffs) than the agency.
137 Although it is true that nonacquiescence may result in "horizontal" uniformity at the
agency level. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 19, at 750.
138 As Coenen correctly notes, uniformity may emerge whether the agency acquiesces or
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policies in different circuits over long periods of time, a policy of automatic acquiescence would probably result in greater uniformity between circuits as well. This suggests one consequentialist reason to
favor the opinions-as-binding-law understanding.
In addition, it is plausible to posit that courts on the whole have
a general comparative advantage relative to the executive branch in
matters of legal interpretation. Certainly, courts can be seen as specialized institutions whose personnel, traditions, and support systems
are all designed to facilitate legal interpretation. Especially important
here are the life tenure and secured compensation guarantees, which
help insulate courts from the pressures of transient public opinion. 139
Executive agencies present a more mixed picture. With respect to
some legal issues, executive interpretation may be preferred, either because the executive agency has greater expertise or precisely because
it is more accountable to the public. 140 But on balance, we tend to
think of courts as the superior interpretative institution, certainly with
respect to constitutional questions. To this extent, we have another
reason for preferring an understanding that would generally shift the
scope of interpretative authoriiy away from agencies toward courts.
C.

Implications for the Style of Judicial Interpretation

On the other hand, the assumption we adopt about the executive
obligation to judicial opinions will also produce sul;>tle but important
changes in the style of judicial decision making.· To adopt Professor
Burt's terminology, 141 under the opinions-as-binding-law conception,
courts will gravitate toward an authoritarian style of decision making.
Under the opinions-as-explanations view, to the contrary, courts will
tend to view interpretation in more egalitarian terms, seeking not
blind obedience but "interactive conciliation" 142 with the other
branches.
The roots of this phenomenon lie in the psychology of both the
Court and its audience. A judiciary that thinks its opinions are binding law is likely to be relatively indifferent to the views of the other
branches about the meaning of the law. In contrast, if opinions are
thought of as explanations for judgments, this suggests that someone
else may come along with a better or different explanation. Thus, one
not if claimants in circuits with contrary rules appeal and obtain a judgment reversing the
agency. Coenen, supra note 19, at 1415-16.
139 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
140 See Merrill, supra note 5, at 1002 and authorities cited n.138.
141 BURT, supra note 13, at 3.
·
142 Id. at 139.
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would expect a judiciary that realizes its opinions are regarded by
other branches as explanations for judgments to be more open to reconsideration when one or more of the other branches dissents. From
the point of view of the Court's audience, if disagreeing with the judicial understanding is tantamount to violating the law, few will have
the temerity to express their doubts. As the reaction to the Meese
speech suggests, the charge that one is advocating lawlessness throws
one on the defensive and requires a response; 143 as is often the case,
the response will get much less notice than the initial charge.
. There are several reasons to prefer a more consultative and interactive style of judicial interpretation. One is that such a style might
mitigate the antidemocratic features of government-by-judiciary.
Stripped of the power to bind the other branches with rules of law, the
courts would have to attend more carefully to the views of the more
politically accountable branches, and limit themselves to rulings likely
to secure voluntary acceptance by these branches. As John Agresto
has argued, our constitutional history has "ftuctuat[ed] between simplistic sentiments of judicial supremacy and more or less impetuous
attempts to 'curb' the Court, with the Court all .the while increasing
its progressive hegemony over public and private life." 144 Perhaps the
best hope for breaking out of this cycle is to adopt the understanding
that "Ll]udicial interpretations do not settle for the political branches
the permanent meaning of the Constitution's text or its principles." 145
Another reason stressed by Professor Burt" is that a Supreme
Court that sees itself as an authoritarian lawgiver is more likely to
make major blunders that exacerbate social tensions and damage its
own institutional reputation. 146 Burt cites the Court's pre-Civil War
efforts to impose a solution to the slavery problem as a prime example, in addition to the Court's pre-New Deal effort to outlaw redistributive social legislation. 147 The recent experience with abortion
regulation also plausibly fits into this pattern. In contrast, if opinions
are merely explanations for judgments, the courts may be more modest about their ability to coerce a solution to such intractable con143 Edwin Meese, Ill, The Tulane Speech: What I Meant, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1986, at
A2l.
144 JOHN AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CoNSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 136
(l 984). See also BICKEL, supra note 26; Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS (1988); John 0. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics:
The Solicitor General's Office in Constitutional and Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L. REV.
799, 805 (1992) (if the President offers the Court an independent view of the meaning of the
Constitution, this affords an "opportunity to correct the mistakes and excesses of the others").
145 AGRESTO, supra note 144, at 129.
146 BURT, supra note 13, at 193.
147 Id. at 163-99, 237-67.
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flicts. 148 As Burt argues, "coercion in any form is the enemy of
democratic life. Institutions of the law can help us toward this understanding by holding out the possibility of mutual renunciation of force
and shared respect in our social relations;" 149
A third reason, which can be traced back to James Bradley
Thayer's pioneering article 150 and has recently been revived by leftleaning legal scholars, 151 is that an authoritarian style of legal interpretation may stultify the capacities of the politically accountable institutions to engage in interpretation. Of particular concern here is
the willingness of Congress and the executive to take responsibility for
enforcing the Constitution, particularly those provisions that may be
"underenforced" because of justiciability or other limits on judicial
action. 152 But even in the area of statutory construction, an executive
branch that grows accustomed to taking its cues from courts may lose
the capacity to engage in imaginative interpretation of the sort often
needed to resolve difficult problems of administration.
Adopting the opinions-as-explanations for judgments understanding would likely change the judicial style in yet another way. If
the courts knew their decisions were viewed as only predictive of future judgments, their ability to exert influence over nonjudicial actors
would depend on whether their future behavior was predictable. In
general, courts would be likely to take several steps to make the implicit promise of future action in their opinions more believable.
First, courts would try to assure that their interpretations are
viewed by the public as legitimate, in the sense that they are perceived
to be grounded in a faithful interpretation of enacted law using conventional tools of interpretation. Rulings perceived to be legitimate
will be followed more readily by lower courts and other actors. Second, courts would try to assure that judicial opinions are comprehen148 Ironically, it is also possible that in some circumstances a judiciary aware of the possibility of executive nonacquiescence would be more aggressive about enforcing the Constitution.
For example, in his dissenting opinion in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 247-48
(1944), Justice Jackson suggested that the proper way to reconcile constitutional norms of
equal treatment with the need to avoid judicial interference with judgments of military necessity was for the Court to overturn convictions for violating the military's evacuation order, but
not to interfere with the military's own implementation of the policy. Had Jackson's view
prevailed, the Court would have invalidated the conviction in Korematsu, rather than feeling
compelled to affirm out of deference to military judgment about risks.
149 BURT, supra note 13, at 375.
150 James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,
7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
151 See, e.g., Paul Brest, Constitutional Citizenship, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175 (1986); Robin
West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641 (1990).
152 Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).
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sible, in the sense that the judicial statement of what the law requires
is well-defined and its application in most cases nonproblematic. Obscurity gives rise to opportunities for evasion and this would be
avoided to the extent possible. Third-and perhaps the most significant for present purposes-courts would be forced to adhere closely
to their own past precedents. As Henry Monaghan has observed, if
the Supreme Court does not take its own opinions seriously, eventually the rest of society will not either. 153 If the rest of society understood that opinions were merely predictions of future judicial
judgments, the Court would have to take its own prior opinions very
seriously indeed in order to make its claim to authority believable. 154
Obviously, whether one thinks a more conventional, careful, and
precedent-bound judiciary is good or bad will depend on one's vision
of the role of the courts in society. Those who envision a federal judiciary that discovers new rights and imposes those discoveries on the
political branches will be distressed by the prospect of a decline in
judicial assertiveness. Such persons will be inescapably drawn to the
view that judicial opinions are law, and that the political branches
have a duty to obey that law. For only on this vision does the judiciary maintain the discretion to make and unmake legal doctrine, while
all other actors must fall in line behind whatever the latest word from
the Supreme Court happens to be.
In contrast, those who embrace a more restrained view of the
federal judiciary should be drawn to the opinions-as-explanations conception. In this view, interpretative power is shared among the
branches, and the courts are seen as being engaged in a continuing
conversation with the political branches over the proper understanding of law. More fundamentally, the source of judicial power is revealed to be the legitimacy, clarity, and consistency with which the
courts articulate and then maintain those understandings.
153 Henry P. Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 Mo. L. REV. 1
(1979); see also D'Amato, supra note 82, at 488-89 (judges who fail to follow their prior
decisions consistently will find themselves "treated as an arbitrary 'risk' within the system,
with their pronouncements and commands ignored and their power to control public behavior
greatly eroded") (footnote omitted); Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial
Decisions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 422, 429 (1988).
154 The history of precedent in England provides some support for this proposition. The
English common law courts adopted the absolute rule of stare decisis only after they abandoned the understanding that rules of common law are discovered rather than made. See
CROSS & HARRIS, supra note 75, at 24-36. In effect, deprived of the authority associated with
the idea that judges discover a timeless and immutable law, the English courts turned to the
absolute rule of stare decisis as a basis for their legitimacy. See id.
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CONCLUSION

We are now in a position to explain why there has been an apparent shift toward the view that judicial opinions are law in the last
thirty years. 155 This coincides with the period when the federal judiciary began seeking to use its powers to achieve fundamental social
change-most notably. in the heyday of the Warren Court, but to a
lesser extent also under the Burger Court. The conception that opinions are law is a vital prop of the program for social change through
litigation; it implies that courts are free to make and unmake legal
doctrine under the flexibility of the doctrine of horizontal stare decisis, while the rest of the world is bound to obey judicial understandings as if they are a "ukase." 156 Thus, the opinions-as-law view
supplies a formula under which judicial reformers can bridge the
seemingly contradictory demands of their enterprise-requiring at
once that courts change the law and yet that the new Judicial understanding be accepted as authoritative.
The view that courts should function as catalysts of social change
may be on the wane, if only because social reformers now view the
political branches as more promising for these purposes. 157 One way
in which this shift in perspective could be ·encouraged would be
through a general repudiation of the dicta in Cooper v. Aaron, and the
adoption of the understanding that judicial opinions are, at least from
the perspective of nonjudicial actors, merely explanations for judgments. If proponents of progressive politics propose such a repudiation, then proponents of conservative courts should give serious
consideration to accepting the offer-even if they are temporarily in
control of the judicial branch. In the long run, courts understood to
lack the power to bind the other branches to their understandings of
law will be more conventional, more cautious, more consensus-seeking-in short, more conservative-than the institution we have
known since Cooper was decided.
See supra text accompanying notes 26-30.
Kurland, supra note 99, at 327.
157 See, e.g., West,supra note 151.
155
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